08-03-2022, 09:57 AM
Gatha-28
Surely, the soul – jñāyaka – is of the nature of knowledge (jñāna) and all substances are the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya). The soul – jñāyaka – does not inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya), as the eye is able to see material objects without inhering in these.
Explanatory Note:
Although the soul (ātmā) and the substance – the object of knowledge (jñeya) – enjoy the knower-known (jñāyaka-jñeya) relationship, the soul (ātmā) remains the knower (jñāyaka) not the substance (jñeya), and the substance remains the object-of-knowledge (jñeya) not the knower (jñāyaka). The knower and the known do not become one; these do not leave their own nature. Just as the eye is able to know the material thing without entering the material thing and the material thing becomes known without entering the eye, similarly, the soul (ātmā, jñāyaka) knows all objects-of-knowledge (jñeya) without entering the objects-of knowledge (jñeya) and the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya) become known without entering the soul (ātmā, jñāyaka). Due to this character, empirically, the soul is all-pervasive (sarvagata).
Gatha-29
The soul with infinite knowledge that is beyond the five senses – atīndriya jñāna – does not inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya). In addition, it is not that it does not inhere in the objects of- knowledge (jñeya); empirically, it does inhere in the objects of-knowledge (jñeya). It knows and sees, as these are, all objects of the universe as the eye knows and sees material objects.
Explanatory Note:
From the transcendental-point-of-view (niscayanaya), the soul with sense-independent, infinite knowledge – atīndriya jñāna – does not inhere in the objects-of knowledge (jñeya), but this does not hold true from all standpoints.
From the empirical-point-of-view (vyavahāranaya), the soul does inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya). Surely, the eye does not touch the material object and the material object too does not touch the eye; still the eye knows and sees the material object. However, from the empirical-point-of-view (vyavahāranaya), we say that the eye touches the material object and the material object touches the eye. In the samy way, the soul, surely, does not inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya) but it has variegated strength as the knower; it knows and sees the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya) as if it inheres in these. Therefore, empirically, the soul does inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya).
Surely, the soul – jñāyaka – is of the nature of knowledge (jñāna) and all substances are the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya). The soul – jñāyaka – does not inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya), as the eye is able to see material objects without inhering in these.
Explanatory Note:
Although the soul (ātmā) and the substance – the object of knowledge (jñeya) – enjoy the knower-known (jñāyaka-jñeya) relationship, the soul (ātmā) remains the knower (jñāyaka) not the substance (jñeya), and the substance remains the object-of-knowledge (jñeya) not the knower (jñāyaka). The knower and the known do not become one; these do not leave their own nature. Just as the eye is able to know the material thing without entering the material thing and the material thing becomes known without entering the eye, similarly, the soul (ātmā, jñāyaka) knows all objects-of-knowledge (jñeya) without entering the objects-of knowledge (jñeya) and the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya) become known without entering the soul (ātmā, jñāyaka). Due to this character, empirically, the soul is all-pervasive (sarvagata).
Gatha-29
The soul with infinite knowledge that is beyond the five senses – atīndriya jñāna – does not inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya). In addition, it is not that it does not inhere in the objects of- knowledge (jñeya); empirically, it does inhere in the objects of-knowledge (jñeya). It knows and sees, as these are, all objects of the universe as the eye knows and sees material objects.
Explanatory Note:
From the transcendental-point-of-view (niscayanaya), the soul with sense-independent, infinite knowledge – atīndriya jñāna – does not inhere in the objects-of knowledge (jñeya), but this does not hold true from all standpoints.
From the empirical-point-of-view (vyavahāranaya), the soul does inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya). Surely, the eye does not touch the material object and the material object too does not touch the eye; still the eye knows and sees the material object. However, from the empirical-point-of-view (vyavahāranaya), we say that the eye touches the material object and the material object touches the eye. In the samy way, the soul, surely, does not inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya) but it has variegated strength as the knower; it knows and sees the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya) as if it inheres in these. Therefore, empirically, the soul does inhere in the objects-of-knowledge (jñeya).